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MINIMIZING THE ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
OF OIL AND GAS DEVELOPMENT BY
MAXIMIZING PRODUCTION CONSERVATION
DAVID E. PIERCE*

ABSTRACT
One oil and gas well results in less environmental impact and surface
disruption than two wells. The number of wells required to efficiently develop an oil and gas reservoir can be significantly reduced, while increasing
the ultimate recovery of the oil and gas resource, if the reservoir can be
developed without regard for the rule of capture. Current oil and gas
“conservation” regulation is built around the rule of capture, which creates
the legal necessity to be associated with an oil and gas well in order to
secure rights in the oil and gas. By shifting the focus of rights in oil and gas
reservoirs away from capture rights and toward correlative rights, state oil
and gas conservation commissions can better manage development of the
oil and gas resource, allowing all interested parties to maximize recovery of
their oil and gas resources while minimizing the impact on surface and
other natural resources.
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INTRODUCTION

American property law has conspired against the oil and gas industry
since the first wells were drilled and courts were called upon to define
rights in the oil and gas resource. The “rule of capture” was initially a rule
of necessity that quickly became the foundational principle for defining
rights in oil and gas.1 The rule simply provides that in order to perfect
ownership in oil and gas, you must associate yourself with a well that
extracts the oil and gas from beneath your land.2 Unfortunately, the venerable rule of capture continues as the foundation of property in oil and gas.
Although the rule of capture spawned the oil and gas production
conservation movement,3 the promise of production conservation has never
been fully realized.4 Today, every state’s system of oil and gas conservation regulation, including that of North Dakota, has the rule of capture at its

1. See, e.g., Hail v. Reed, 54 Ky. 383, 383-84 (1854) (explaining that when courts began
defining oil and gas rights, it was believed that oil and gas flowed in underground streams and
would be forever lost unless immediately reduced to possession); see also 1 EUGENE KUNTZ, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS 111 (1987) (“From the early opinions, it is apparent that
it was believed that oil and gas were migratory in the [same] sense that they flowed in underground streams or were otherwise capable of lateral migration even when there had been no artificial interference with the structures containing them.”) (citations omitted); Continental Resources,
Inc. v. Farrar Oil Co., 559 N.W.2d 841, 844 (N.D. 1997) (“It was thought that oil, like water,
flowed in underground streams, and the law analogized the ownership of oil to the ownership of
water and wild animals that could be captured when they crossed one’s property.”) (citing 1
BRUCE M. KRAMER & PATRICK H. MARTIN, THE LAW OF POOLING AND UNITIZATION § 2.01 (3d
ed. 1996)).
2. Barnard v. Monongahela Natural Gas Co., 65 A. 801, 802 (1907) (reciting a classic
statement of the rule where an owner’s sole protection from drainage toward producing wells on
other lands is to “do likewise” by drilling wells to capture oil and gas within the owner’s land).
3. ROBERT E. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF OIL AND GAS LAW 253-54 (1955) (citations
omitted). Professor Sullivan traces the development of conservation regulation in his treatise,
noting, “The transition has been from unrestrained production necessitated by the Rule of Capture
and judicial recognition of the right to commit waste to regulated production and the prohibition
of waste.” Id.
4. See David Edward Pierce, Coordinated Reservoir Development—An Alternative to the
Rule of Capture for the Ownership and Development of Oil and Gas: Part I, 4 J. OF ENERGY L. &
POL’Y 1, 4 (1983). The author observed twenty-seven years ago, “Although the benefits of
production conservation are readily recognized, the American oil and gas property system has
evolved into the single major obstacle to realizing the great potential of production conservation.”
Id. Interestingly, nothing has changed in twenty-seven years to alter the accuracy of this
statement; it is as relevant today as it was in 1983.
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core.5 Until this is changed, waste in the form of unnecessary drilling, and
the associated environmental degradation, will continue; the inability to
maximize recovery of the available oil and gas resource will continue. The
capture regime will also haunt technological advances that require cooperation instead of competition in the subsurface porous and permeable rock
structures where oil and gas reside. Whether contemplating hydraulic fracturing or carbon sequestration, a capture-based property regime will continue to create conceptual, practical, and artificial hurdles for developers.6
The quick-fix common law solution to the historical capture-based property regime is to embrace the connected nature of the common reservoir
instead of competing with it.7 This can be done by elevating “correlative
rights” principles to the position now held by the rule of capture.8
Elevating correlative rights to this position can be accomplished by
motivated oil and gas conservation commissions and a public that demands

5. This means owners must have a well associated with their land in order to protect their oil
and gas interests through production. The reference to a well “associated with their land” means
the owners either have a well physically on their land or within a pooled area in which their land
participates.
6. Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1, 9-17 (Tex. 2008)
(discussing the Texas Supreme Court’s recent attempt to address the propriety of hydraulic
fracturing under the rule of capture and traditional property ownership concepts). The court, in a
5-4 decision, applied the rule of capture to avoid determining whether a fracture that crossed a
property boundary constituted a trespass. Id. at 17 (“[W]e hold that damages for drainage by
hydraulic fracturing are precluded by the rule of capture.”).
7. See generally AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF MINING AND METALLURGICAL ENGINEERS,
PETROLEUM CONSERVATION 248-51 (Stuart E. Buckley ed., 1951) (discussing the damage caused
to reservoirs by the rule of capture).
8. The term “correlative rights” is commonly used in two different contexts. The first is in
conjunction with the rule of capture and oil and gas conservation legislation. If an owner’s
capture rights are restrained by conservation regulation, other owners in the common reservoir
must be similarly restrained to protect each owner’s correlative rights. Prior to any regulatory
restraint, each owner can, and must, rely upon their self-help capture rights. However, once an
owner’s capture rights are limited by regulation, the regulatory body must ensure the owner’s
correlative rights are protected in other ways. Generally this is done through limitations placed on
all owners in the common reservoir to achieve a greater conservation good, such as the “prevention of waste” with the resulting “protection of correlative rights.” See, e.g., Hystad v. Indus.
Comm’n, 389 N.W.2d 590, 597 (N.D. 1986). The court also stated that
[e]ven if a pool is in the early stages of development, the Commission’s focus in
establishing spacing units must consider the right of each owner to recover a just and
equitable share of the common source of supply within the context of the other
owners’ interest in that common source of supply.
Id. The second context in which the term “correlative rights” is used is to describe each owner’s
basic property right in the common reservoir. The court in Hystad describes the rights as follows:
[C]orrelative rights includes [sic] interdependent rights and duties of each landowner
in the common source of supply. Each landowner is entitled to a just and equitable
share of oil or gas in the pool; however, that right is limited by the landowner’s duty to
all the other owners of interests in the common source of supply not to damage or take
an undue proportion of the oil or gas from that common source of supply.
Id. at 596.
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more from the commissions than the commissions have been willing to deliver to date. Perhaps the Sierra Club and other environmental groups can
pick up where Henry Doherty left off by moving the industry the next mile
toward true production conservation.9 It is ironic that it may take, at this
late date, outside environmental forces to accomplish what the visionaries
of the oil and gas industry have been unable to accomplish during its 150
years of existence.
II. RULE OF CAPTURE AND “WASTE”
Regardless of the conceptual ownership regime a state adopts to define
rights in oil and gas, oil and gas ownership and development in all states is
ultimately governed by the rule of capture.10 Under the rule of capture, you
must have rights in a well to secure your opportunity to perfect a property
interest in oil and gas; no well means no property rights in the in oil and
gas.11 Extraction of oil and gas is the defining event when inchoate ownership becomes property. The more you can extract, the more you convert
from conceptual ownership to actual ownership. More wells, operated at
their maximum rates of production, yield more real ownership of oil and
gas. Although this may result in unnecessary damage to the environment,
excessive occupancy and use of surface resources, and tremendous waste of
the oil and gas resource itself, it is all justified by a simple common law
reality: if you do not produce the oil and gas and reduce it to property,
someone else will.12
9. DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE: THE EPIC QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY & POWER 220 (1992).
Henry Doherty controlled the Cities Service group of companies and, as one scholar on the oil
industry noted, “He was insistent, tiresomely so, on one theme: The ‘rule of capture’ had to be
eliminated.” Id. Doherty called for unitization of all oil and gas fields through federal mandate.
Id. at 221.
10. 1 EUGENE KUNTZ, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS 116 (1987) (“As to the
matter of ownership of the extracted substances, it is uniformly recognized or assumed by the
courts that the landowner who extracts the oil or gas from beneath his land acquires absolute
ownership of the substances extracted, without regard to the manner of extraction.”) (citations
omitted).
11. Professors Anderson and Smith refer to the rule of capture, and conservation regulation
that has evolved to deal with the rule, as “well-by-well regulation.” Owen L. Anderson & Ernest
E. Smith, Exploratory Unitization Under the 2004 Model Oil and Gas Conservation Act:
Leveling the Playing Field, 24 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVT’L L. 277, 278, 280 (2004)
[hereinafter Anderson & Smith, Exploratory Unitization]; Owen L. Anderson & Ernest E. Smith,
III, The Use of Law to Promote Domestic Exploration and Production, 50 INST. ON OIL & GAS L.
& TAX’N 2-1, 2-65 (1999) [hereinafter Anderson & Smith, Domestic Exploration and Production]
(referring to the conservation regulation that has evolved to deal with the rule of capture as “wellby-well regulation”).
12. See Howard R. Williams, Conservation of Oil and Gas, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1155, 1156
(1952). Professor Williams observed over fifty years ago, “The impact of the rule of capture upon
the fact of divided interests in minerals presents the major obstacle to scientific development of
petroleum-producing formations.” Id. His observation is as accurate today as it was in 1952.

2009]

MAXIMIZING PRODUCTION CONSERVATION

763

All of the losses associated with the rule of capture are measured
against the alternative measure of zero, which is what you get if you do not
associate with a well and engage in capture of the resource. Because the
negative aspects of the rule are shared with others in the reservoir and
society at large, seldom will the negatives of engaging in the practice yourself be less than zero. This means that so long as the projected volume and
value of captured oil and gas exceed the cost of drilling wells and the
required return on investment, wells will be drilled even though the “cost”
to others in the reservoir and society at large may far exceed any one
individual’s return on investment. This is the oil and gas industry’s
“tragedy of the commons.”13
The industry has been cognizant of this tragedy and has fought to
mitigate it since the inception of the industry. Major strides had been made
by 1960,14 but even today the promise of oil and gas conservation has not

13. See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244-45
(1968). Although Professor Hardin focuses on the “commons” associated with grazing lands and
the use of air and water for the discharge of pollutants, the same sort of “tragedy” occurs in the oil
and gas setting where a rule of property—the rule of capture—dictates behavior that is antithetical
to public rights and private community rights in the oil and gas resource. The rule dictates
conduct that would not normally be pursued but for the incentives created by an imperfect
capture-based property regime.
14. ROBERT E. HARWICKE ET AL., CONSERVATION OF OIL & GAS ix-x (Robert E. Sullivan
ed. 1960). The Section of Mineral and Natural Resources Law of the American Bar Association,
as well as a committee of oil and gas law experts, assembled materials assessing the status of oil
and gas conservation regulation as of 1958. Id. In his Report on Progress in Conservation, 19481958, Robert E. Hardwicke observed:
A fine job of waste prevention has been done, partly by state regulation, partly by
voluntary practices of operators, and partly by the aid given by the federal government, especially by enforcement of the Connally Hot-Oil Act and through research
and reports by scientists in the United States Bureau of Mines.
Id. at 4. In 1964, the Interstate Oil Compact Commission published a study of oil and gas
conservation that summarizes accomplishments in the area since the 1930s as follows:
The transition of the petroleum industry and the concurrent evolution of conservation
laws and regulations that have occurred during the past 35 years have been truly
remarkable. From the highly individualistic oil producers of a few decades ago has
emerged, with incredible speed, a branch of a major industry that is comprehensively
and constructively regulated by the states to attain the most efficient exploration for,
development of, and recovery of the oil and gas reserves, and to protect the rights of
all whose interests are involved.
INTERSTATE OIL COMPACT COMM’N, A STUDY OF CONSERVATION OF OIL AND GAS IN THE
UNITED STATES xxiii (Robert E. Hardwicke et al. eds., Interstate Oil Compact Comm’n 1964).
The major accomplishments as of 1965 included spacing, pooling, and prorating production to a
projected market demand. Id. at 176-82. Unitization to allow development of a common reservoir
without regard for the rule of capture remained, as it does today, a mere aspiration. Id. at 185-86.
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been realized.15 The failure of conservation regulation is simple: the statutes in every state operate on a capture-based property model.16
A. THE FAILURE OF STATE CONSERVATION LAWS
All states unnecessarily tolerate environmental degradation, excessive
surface use, and other forms of “waste” of the oil and gas resource.17 This
is because all state oil and gas “conservation”18 statutes have the rule of

15. Anderson & Smith, Domestic Exploration and Production, supra note 11, at 2-76 to 2–
81 (discussing the many significant problems associated with existing compulsory unitization
statutes).
16. Professors Anderson and Kramer note the rule of capture is essential for the efficient
operation of the existing conservation laws. Bruce K. Kramer & Owen L. Anderson, The Rule of
Capture—An Oil and Gas Perspective, 35 ENVTL. L. 899, 899 (2005) (“[C]ontinued recognition
of the rule [of capture], together with recognition of correlative rights, is essential to the efficient
administration of conservation laws.”). Kramer and Anderson state:
Although the rule of capture is constrained by conservation legislation aimed at
minimizing, if not eliminating, many of the ‘social costs’ of the rule, the rule is
actually at the heart of much conservation legislation—making it possible to further
the goals of preventing waste, protecting correlative rights, and conserving oil and gas.
Id. at 901. Their position is explained further by observing, “The rule of capture remains
important to efficient conservation law because, without it, conservation regulations would be
much more complicated, more time consuming, and more costly to administer . . . .” Id. at 951. In
other words, Anderson and Kramer are stating that, given the conservation system that has
evolved and exists today, recognition of the rule of capture is necessary to make it work. That is,
the rule of capture is at the core of existing conservation regulation. The policy issue is whether
that status quo is acceptable. After making their observations about what “is” regarding oil and
gas conservation, Professors Anderson and Kramer note that they too aspire for something better
than the status quo by supporting “early unitization of oil and gas reservoirs.” Id. at 954.
Compared to unrestrained capture, the conservation glass is “half full;” compared to conservation
gains associated with negating the rule of capture, the glass is “half empty.”
17. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-03 (2004). North Dakota’s oil and gas conservation
act provides, “Waste of oil and gas is prohibited.” Id. “Waste” is defined broadly to include:
a. Physical waste, as that term is generally understood in the oil and gas industry.
b. The inefficient, excessive, or improper use of, or the unnecessary dissipation of
reservoir energy.
c. The locating, spacing, drilling, equipping, operating, or producing of any oil or
gas well or wells in a manner which causes, or tends to cause, reduction in the
quantity of oil or gas ultimately recoverable from a pool under prudent and proper
operations, or which causes or tends to cause unnecessary or excessive surface
loss or destruction of oil or gas.
d. The inefficient storing of oil.
e. The production of oil or gas in excess of transportation or marketing facilities or
in excess of reasonable market demand.
Id. § 38-08-02(16).
18. Even the term “conservation” regulation has a somewhat checkered past. The term
“conservation” was chosen because it sounds much better than state-sanctioned “price fixing.”
See Pierce, supra note 4, at 62-63 (quoting Marshall & Myers, Legal Planning of Petroleum
Production, 41 YALE L.J. 33, 65 (1931) (“Conservation even to the statesman is more a matter of
price levels than the elimination of wastes.”)).
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capture as their foundation.19 To protect your “correlative rights” in the oil
and gas in place, you need a well. The oil and gas conservation authority
will issue a drilling permit if the applicant can show compliance with,
among other requirements, “spacing” regulations.20 Spacing regulations are
premised on either a state-wide rule21 or a special rule that seeks to define
the maximum area that can be efficiently drained by a single well.22 This is
a capture model. To perfect ownership in the oil and gas beneath your
property, you need to be associated with a well. Spacing requirements
merely specify that the rule of capture must be played using squares and
rectangles. Pooling adds nothing to the mix, except to provide a mechanism to combine separate properties within the designated square or rectangle with which the capture game must be played.23 Although no one
would deny that conservation laws have averted a substantial amount of
waste, they have done so by tacitly accepting a substantial amount of waste
through the preservation of a capture-based regulatory regime.
19. Instead of seeking to alter the rule of capture, which precipitated the need for conservation regulation, regulation has been designed around the rule to accommodate its core concept:
you must have a well and extract oil and gas from your land in order to perfect ownership of the
resource. The resulting conservation regulation merely sets ground rules for playing the capture
game. Id. at 62 (“All producing states, by adopting conservation measures which fail to eliminate
capture concepts, have accepted and continue to accept, substantial waste of the oil and gas
resource.”).
20. E.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-05 (Supp. 2009) (“It is unlawful to commence operations
for the drilling of a well for oil or gas without first obtaining a permit from the industrial
commission under such rules as may be prescribed by the commission . . . .”). This statute has
been implemented by rule 43-02-03-16 of the North Dakota Administrative Code which requires
an application for a permit to drill and provides, “No drilling activity shall commence until such
application is approved and a permit to drill is issued by the director.” N.D. ADMIN. CODE 43-0203-16 (2008). This allows the Oil & Gas Division of the North Dakota Industrial Commission to
review the application and ensure it complies fully with all legal requirements, including Rule 4302-03-18 concerning “Drilling Units—Well Locations.” Id. 43-02-03-18. The relevant oil and gas
regulations, forms, orders, and other regulatory direction can be found at the North Dakota
Industrial Commission, Department of Mineral Resources, Oil and Gas Division website,
https://www.dmr nd.gov/oilgas/.
21. E.g., Id. 43-02-03-18(1). North Dakota establishes default “drilling units” for vertical or
directional oil wells by requiring a governmental quarter-quarter section for completions “not
deeper than the Mission Canyon formation” and a governmental quarter section for wells
projected to a depth “deeper than the Mission Canyon formation[.]” Id. This rule also specifies
drilling units for horizontal wells and gas wells. Id. 43-02-03-18(1)(a)-(b).
22. The default drilling unit will be replaced by a commission order “prescribing a temporary
spacing pattern for the development of the pool.” Id. 43-02-03-18(4). The rule contemplates that a
hearing to establish a temporary spacing pattern will take place within thirty days following a
discovery of oil or gas. Id. Within eighteen months from the time a temporary order is issued, the
commission will adopt a final spacing order for the pool. Id. The commission must follow section
38-08-07 of the North Dakota Century Code when establishing spacing units. N.D. CENT. CODE §
38-08-07 (2009).
23. E.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-08(1) (“When two or more separately owned tracts are
embraced within a spacing unit, or when there are separately owned interests in all or a part of the
spacing unit, then the owners and royalty owners thereof may pool their interests for development
and operation of the spacing unit.”).
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B. MODEL OIL AND GAS CONSERVATION ACT
The latest version of the Model Oil and Gas Conservation Act (2004
Model Act), offered in 2004 by the Interstate Oil and Gas Compact
Commission (IOGCC),24 continues a capture-based regulatory regime.
Although the 2004 Model Act offers up the laudable improvement of
exploratory unitization,25 it retains at its core the basic right to go-it-alone
on a capture basis unless you can assemble a super-majority of like-minded
working interest owners and royalty owners.26 This means that most oil and
gas fields will continue to be developed on a capture basis governed by a
regime of spacing,27 density regulation,28 and pooling.29 Field-wide unitization, and the newly proposed exploratory unitization, each require a
working interest owner to take the initiative to seek unitization followed by
a campaign to sell the concept to not less than sixty percent of the working
interest and royalty interest owners.30 This scheme ensures that the rule of

24. INTERSTATE OIL AND GAS COMPACT COMM’N, 2004 MODEL OIL AND GAS
CONSERVATION ACT, available at http:/www.iogcc.state.ok.us/Websites/iogcc/docs/ModelActDec2004.pdf [hereinafter 2004 Model Act]. The IOGCC was formerly the Interstate Oil Compact
Commission (IOCC). Id. at xiv-xv (summarizing the purpose and early work of the IOCC). The
current mission and works of the IOGCC are described in its website. IOGCC, http://www.
iogcc.state.ok.us/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2010).
25. 2004 Model Act, supra note 24, §§ 22-28; see Anderson & Smith, Exploratory
Unitization, supra note 11, at 286. Professors Anderson and Smith convincingly make the case
for exploratory unitization, and provide an outline of how it can be implemented. Anderson &
Smith, Domestic Exploration and Production, supra note 11, at 2-86 to 2-94.
26. 2004 Model Act, supra note 24, § 24. The Model Act contemplates the consent of sixty
percent of the working interest owners and royalty owners before an exploratory unit can become
effective. Id.
27. Id. § 10.
28. Id. § 10(a), lines 37-39. Density regulation is achieved under the 2004 Model Act by
requiring that “a spacing unit must consist of the maximum area of a reservoir that may be
efficiently and economically drained by one well . . . .” Id.
29. Id. § 11.
30. Under the 2004 Model Act, a state’s regulatory commission is given, at most, very
limited authority to initiate unitization. The 2004 Model Act begins by identifying those things
the commission can “require” and those things it can “regulate.” Section 5 identifies those things
the commission can “require” such as “the testing of wells used in oil and gas production . . . .” Id.
§ 5(f). Unit operations are not included under any of the “require” categories. Instead, the commission is given the authority to “regulate,” as opposed to “require,” a “unit operation of any
kind.” Id. § 7(g). However, for non-exploratory units the 2004 Model Act provides the commission, “upon its own motion. . . shall conduct a hearing to consider the need for unit operation
of an entire reservoir or portion thereof, to increase ultimate recovery of oil or gas from that
reservoir or portion thereof.” Id. § 13, lines 7-9. If the commission finds that unit operation is
“reasonably necessary to prevent waste or to protect correlative rights[,]” then the commission
“shall issue an order requiring unit operation . . . .” Id. at lines 9-17. Although this seems to
provide the commission with the authority to unitize, the 2004 Model Act still requires that any
“order requiring a unit operation” be approved by at least sixty percent of the working interest and
royalty interest owners. Id. § 17, lines 30-38 (emphasis added). The new exploratory unitization
provisions require “application of an owner” to begin the process. Id. The commission cannot
order a hearing on its own motion. Id. § 22, lines 15-17.
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capture will determine the future development of oil and gas fields even in
states that adopt the most recent version of the Model Act.
C. NORTH DAKOTA’S OIL AND GAS CONSERVATION ACT
The North Dakota Oil and Gas Conservation Act31 is patterned after
earlier versions of the Model Oil and Gas Conservation Act.32 As with the
model acts, North Dakota’s act places primary reliance on spacing33 and
pooling34 to moderate the rule of capture. The North Dakota provisions on
unitization are, on balance, generally better than in many states because a
field can be unitized with the approval of sixty percent of working interest
and royalty interest owners, “excluding overriding royalties, production
payments, and other interests carved out of the working interest . . . .”35
However, the statute still contemplates a passive role for the state regulatory
commission in evaluating and approving a unitization petition submitted by
a working interest owner,36 and any commission order requires approval by
at least sixty percent of the affected working interest and royalty interest
owners.37 The bottom line is that in North Dakota, as in other states, the
rule of capture guides development of the oil and gas resource. The
operative conservation technique, as in all other states, is essentially the
spacing unit.

31. N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 38-08-01 to -23 (2004 & Supp. 2009).
32. See Kemp Wilson, Conservation Acts and Correlative Rights: Has the Pendulum Swung
Too Far?, 35 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 18-1, 18-10 n.19 (1989) (“North Dakota embraced the
1940 model provisions nearly before the ink was dry on the same, adopting them in toto during
the 1941 legislative session and at a time when there were no producing oil wells in the state!”).
North Dakota has long been recognized as a leader in adopting conservation legislation in a timely
manner. See BLAKELY M. MURPHY, CONSERVATION OF OIL AND GAS, A LEGAL HISTORY, 1948
348-58 (1949) (detailing legislative history from 1907 to 1948); CONSERVATION OF OIL AND GAS,
A LEGAL HISTORY–1958 171-81 (Robert Sullivan ed., 1960) (detailing legislative history from
1951 to 1958).
33. N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-07 to -08 (2004 & Supp. 2009). “When necessary to prevent
waste, to avoid the drilling of unnecessary wells, or to protect correlative rights, the commission
shall establish spacing units for a pool . . . .” § 38-08-07.
34. Id. § 38-08-08 (“In the absence of voluntary pooling, the commission upon the
application of any interested person shall enter an order pooling all interests in the spacing unit for
the development and operations thereof . . . .”).
35. Id. § 38-08-09.5. Generally, the approval percentages are higher in other states. See
Anderson & Smith, Domestic Exploration and Production, supra note 11, at 2-78 (citing states
with percentages ranging from 63% to 80%).
36. N.D. CENT. CODE § 38-08-09.3 (2004 & Supp. 2009). It is not clear under the North
Dakota statute whether the commission can file a “petition” or whether the commission must wait
for action by a working interest owner. Section 38-08-09.3 states, “If upon the filing of a
petition . . . .” Id. There is nothing to indicate who can file the petition, but subsequent sections
assume it will be a working interest owner. Id. §§ 38-08-09.3 to -09.11.
37. Id. § 38-08-09.5.
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III. CORRELATIVE RIGHTS: THE FORGOTTEN CORNERSTONE
OF OIL AND GAS PROPERTY LAW
Correlative rights recognize that each owner overlying an oil and gas
reservoir has rights and duties with regard to other owners above the reservoir. The connected nature of the reservoir rock structure38 makes it possible for any owner conducting operations within the reservoir to impact
other owners.39 Conceptually, this initially appears to be a nuisance-based
right: one owner cannot use its land so as to unreasonably interfere with the
use of surrounding lands. At the surface, the common medium being fouled
is often air, water, or land. Beneath the surface, the common medium,
regarding oil and gas, is the porous and permeable rock structure where the
oil and gas reside.40 Correlative rights, however, are more “property” than
“tort.” Nuisance is a tort remedy to protect property; it does not define the
property itself. Therefore, ownership of the oil and gas gives rise to the
associated correlative rights that define what can and cannot be done in the
reservoir. Correlative rights are part of the bundle of sticks comprising
ownership of the oil and gas, much like the rights to lateral and subjacent
support are part of the bundle of sticks comprising land ownership.
The most important aspect of correlative rights are the extra-territorial
rights created in each owner in the reservoir. For example, if A is engaging
in acts totally within the boundaries of A’s property, but the activity
negatively impacts the reservoir in some way, B and others owning rights in
the reservoir may be able to enjoin A to protect their property interests in
the reservoir. Similarly, B may have the affirmative right to impact A’s

38. The connection may exist due to the porosity and permeability of the rock structure, the
effective communication of minute fractures that comprise the rock structure, or a combination of
the two.
39. E.g., Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W.2d 558, 563 (Tex. 1948) (noting the existence
of a landowner’s duty not to negligently conduct operations that damage the reservoir and the
ability of adjacent landowners to exercise their capture rights). Generally this ability to impact
others in the reservoir has been viewed as imposing duties on owners not to injure the reservoir.
Id. However, it can also be viewed as conferring rights on owners to engage in prudent conduct
within the reservoir even though it will impact others. E.g., Trees Oil Co. v. State Corp. Comm’n,
105 P.3d 1269, 1287 (Kan. 2005) (discussing landowners’ correlative rights to conduct secondary
recovery operations, pursuant to compulsory unitization statutes, even though it will interrupt nonconsenting working interest owner’s current cash flow from a well within the unit boundary).
This is the proper ownership context in which to address hydraulic fracturing issues. Due to the
connected nature of the reservoir, and the availability of accepted hydraulic fracturing techniques
to maximize recovery, each owner has the right to engage in the activity without liability to other
owners in the reservoir. It is one of the correlative rights of being an owner within a common
reservoir. See Theresa D. Poindexter, Correlative Rights Doctrine, Not the Rule of Capture,
Provides Correct Analysis for Resolving Hydraulic Fracturing Cases [Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v.
Garza Energy Trust, 268 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008)], 48 WASHBURN L.J. 755, 779 (2009).
40. See AM. PETROLEUM INST., INTRODUCTION TO OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION 1-6 (1983)
(describing the basic principles of petroleum geology).
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property to the extent it positively impacts the reservoir in some way. This
second observation may appear to be a bit radical, but it is the logical corollary of the first principle. Parties owning property in a reservoir must be
cognizant of the rights of all parties to effectively maximize their rights in
the reservoir, so long as they do not injure the reservoir. This prevents parties from trying to artificially fence off their connected tract when they do
not agree with what is best for the collective owners of the reservoir.41
Individual rights and collective rights must be evaluated to define each
party’s precise rights and duties under a given set of circumstances.
Correlative rights have been a recognized adjunct to oil and gas ownership
for over 100 years.42 When courts were tentative regarding a state’s right to
control oil and gas development to protect the public against “waste,”
courts relied primarily on a private basis for state action: the protection of
correlative rights.43 Once state action for the prevention of waste became
41. In Trees Oil Co. v. State Corp. Commission, the Kansas Supreme Court upheld the
Kansas Corporation Commission’s compulsory unitization order, which required a non-consenting
working interest owner to shut down a well that was currently generating a positive cash flow.
105 P.3d 1269, 1287 (Kan. 2005). Trees objected to unitization and just wanted to be left alone to
produce its well. In the following excerpt, a witness for the unitization proponent (the author)
describes the correlative rights discussion that took place during the “fairness hearing” before the
commission:
Although not addressed in the justices’ opinions, one of the more interesting discussions during the hearing before the Commission is the essence of Trees’ working
interest “ownership” in a pressure-connected reservoir. During the hearing I noted
that the concept of “correlative rights” consists of two elements: “rights” that are “correlative.” This is best demonstrated by Trees’ major objection: they have a well producing on their leased land that is generating a positive cash flow for the company.
How can they be forced to give up this cash flow for potential income in the future?
The answer concerns the “connected” nature of their lease. Because they are part of a
reservoir, and actions on their land can impact the rights of the owners of 16 other
wells in the proposed unit (and those well owners can, in turn, impact the Trees well),
the correlative nature of their interest is a limitation on their rights. The correlative
nature of the interest also gives them rights in the reservoir as a whole–these are the
reciprocal rights being exercised by the other owners to make Trees go along with
decisions that have been reviewed and approved by the Commission. The Commission is concerned with protecting the correlative rights of all owners in the reservoir
while also seeking to conserve the oil and gas resource through the prevention of
“waste.”
Discussion Notes, 162 OIL & GAS RPTR. 498, 499 (2007), reproduced in JOHN S. LOWE ET AL.,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON OIL AND GAS LAW 291 (5th ed. 2008).
42. See Mfrs’ Gas & Oil Co. v. Indiana Natural Gas & Oil Co., 57 N.E. 912, 917 (Ind. 1900)
(holding that the gas company could not use pumps that would accelerate the reduction of gas
pressure of reservoir because it would accelerate salt water intrusion, adversely affecting other gas
producers).
43. Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 210 (1990). The United States Supreme Court
explained:
Viewed, then, as a statute to protect or to prevent the waste of the common property of
the surface owners, the law . . . in substance, is a statute protecting private property
and preventing it from being taken by one of the common owners without regard to
the enjoyment of the others.
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ensconced in American jurisprudence,44 the protection of correlative rights
became a secondary basis for state action.45 Too often courts have failed to
recognize the important correlative rights component of oil and gas ownership, focusing instead on ill-fitting concepts such as the rule of capture.
This seemingly “unseen” nature of correlative rights was recently illustrated
by the Texas Supreme Court, which used the rule of capture to try to solve a
problem that was, in essence, a correlative rights problem.46
The rule of capture was used in Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza
Energy Trust47 to avoid liability for hydraulic fracturing operations that sent
a fracture through the reservoir underlying the operator’s property and into
a portion of the reservoir underlying the land of an adjacent landowner.48
Instead of evaluating the nature of the physical intrusion into the adjacent
landowner’s portion of the reservoir, the court held liability did not exist
because the only injury alleged was the loss of hydrocarbons through
drainage.49 The court concluded that because the drainage was encompassed by the rule of capture, no damage existed and, therefore, no liability
resulted.50 The obvious flaw in this analysis was the failure to address the
lawfulness of the event giving rise to the drainage.51 If the event was

Id.
44. Henderson Co. v. Thompson has been identified as the first case where the United States
Supreme Court relied upon a pure “waste” prevention rationale to uphold state action. 300 U.S.
258, 258-59, 262-64 (1937). Cases prior to Henderson mentioned waste prevention but were
quick to also support the state’s action using a correlative rights rationale. See Pierce, supra note
4, at 58-62.
45. In Burford v. Sun Oil Co., the United States Supreme Court volunteered the observation
that the public’s interest in preventing waste can require “that the speculative interests of individual tract owners will be put aside when necessary to prevent the irretrievable loss of oil in other
parts of the field.” 319 U.S. 315, 324 (1943).
46. See Poindexter, supra note 39, at 756-57.
47. 268 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008).
48. Coastal, 268 S.W.3d at 13.
49. Id. at 1. The court first took a trip down the common law forms of action, noting that
because the complaining party, the leased mineral interest owner, presently owned only a
possibility of reverter in the leased land, the owner lack the necessary possessory interest to sue
for trespass caused by the physical invasion. Id. at 9-11. Although “trespass on the case” provides
a cause of action for injury to a non-possessory interest, the owner of the reversion could not rely
upon a mere trespass on the land—which right resides with the possessory interest owner—but
rather must have proved “actual permanent harm to the property of such sort as to affect the value
of his interest.” Id. at 9-10.
50. Id. at 17 (“[W]e hold that damages for drainage by hydraulic fracturing are precluded by
the rule of capture.”).
51. Concurring Justice Willett, along with the three dissenting justices, would have addressed
the trespass issue. Id. at 29 (“Such encroachment isn’t just ‘no actionable trespass’; it’s no trespass
at all.”) (Willett, J., concurring); id. at 42 (“I would not address whether the rule of capture
precludes damages when oil and gas is produced through hydraulic fractures that extend across
lease lines until it is determined whether hydraulically fracturing across lease lines is a trespass.”)
(Johnson, J., dissenting).
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lawful, the drainage would have been legitimate under the rule of capture.
If the event was not lawful, the drainage would not have been legitimate
and, therefore, the draining party would not have been exempt from
liability. The legitimacy of the drainage depends upon whether the fracture
crossing a boundary line is more like slant drilling, as opposed to legitimate
completion operations of a well properly bottomed on the developer’s
property.
Addressing the issue in a surface-oriented context suggests that any
entry into the adjacent lands is a trespass.52 But addressing the issue in a
correlative rights context requires that the conduct itself be evaluated to
determine whether it is appropriate behavior within the reservoir community.53 Under a correlative rights analysis, if the hydraulic fracturing is held
to be “appropriate behavior within the reservoir community,” the resulting
drainage will be protected by the rule of capture. On the other hand, if the
hydraulic fracturing is held to violate correlative rights of others within the
reservoir community, drainage will not be protected by the rule of capture.
Using a correlative rights analysis requires that the true nature of all
owners’ rights in the reservoir be defined before the conduct at issue is
evaluated. It is not a simple trespass issue because each owner overlying
the reservoir in fact has rights in the reservoir beneath every other owners’
land. This creates a sort of cotenant-like relationship throughout the common reservoir, where no single owner has exclusive rights or an absolute
say as to what can or cannot take place within the reservoir. When it is
recognized that each owner possesses certain undivided rights within the

52. The court in Coastal acknowledges this, stating, “Had Coastal caused something like
proppants to be deposited on the surface of Share 13 [the adjacent land], it would be liable for
trespass . . . .” Id. at 11. “Proppants” are the material left behind to prop open the fissures created
in the reservoir rock by the hydraulic fracturing fluid. See John W. Broomes, Wrestling with a
Downhole Dilemma: Subsurface Trespass, Correlative Rights, and the Need for Hydraulic
Fracturing in Tight Reservoirs, 53 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. § 20-1, § 20-5 (2007) (describing
the hydraulic fracturing process).
53. KUNTZ, supra note 10, at 120. Professor Kuntz observed:
The owners in the common source of supply operate in a special community and the
social acceptability of conduct within such community must be determined, not only
by applying the standards applicable to conduct generally, but by also considering the
utility of the conduct in the light of the peculiar consequence to others operating in the
same community.
Id. Professor Kuntz was conceptualizing this “special community” standard as a limitation on
what owners can do on their land. He prefaced his comment with the statement, “It is a simple
doctrine that owners of rights in a common source of supply may not inflict loss upon one another
by conduct which is considered to be socially undesirable.” Id. Coastal provides an opportunity to
refine Professor Kuntz’s observations by finding that each owner in the “special community”
possesses an affirmative right to engage in conduct deemed socially desirable in the community—
such as hydraulic fracturing that increases recovery from the reservoir comprising the special
community.
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reservoir, it becomes apparent that intra-reservoir issues lack the basic
exclusivity required for the application of trespass concepts. This is what
the court missed in Coastal. Although the court purported to depart from
traditional ad coelum concepts,54 a departure was not necessary because the
exclusivity contemplated by ad coelum concepts simply does not exist
regarding issues among owners within a common reservoir. Similarly, the
rule of capture does not come into play until the underlying property rights
of the parties are defined. The property model the court operated under was
a single landowner that had total dominance over his or her property—
another classic ad coelum concept.55 However, this was not an accurate
model because no single landowner has total dominance over a common
reservoir that underlies lands owned by others.56 Instead, an owner’s rights
are correlative.
Correlative rights are the essence of oil and gas ownership in a common reservoir. An owner’s capture rights are limited by the correlative
rights of other owners that impose reciprocal duties on each owner not to
exercise their capture rights, or any other rights, that could impair
maximum efficient recovery of the oil and gas resource from the reservoir.
Correlative rights, consistent with the public interest in preventing waste,
focus on maximizing the resource benefits for all reservoir co-owners as
opposed to merely maximizing an individual owner’s capture rights. Once
conservation statutes and oil and gas ownership are properly oriented
around correlative rights as opposed to capture rights, courts and administrative agencies can, for the first time, truly approach the effective prevention of waste and protection of correlative rights.

54. Coastal, 268 S.W.3d at 11. The Texas Supreme Court observed in Coastal:
[F]rom the ancient common law maxim that land ownership extends to the sky above
and the earth’s center below, one might extrapolate that the same rule should apply
two miles below the surface. But that maxim—cujus est solum ejus est usque ad
coelum et ad inferos—“has no place in the modern world.” Wheeling an airplane
across the surface of one’s property without permission is a trespass; flying the plane
through the airspace two miles above the property is not. Lord Coke, who pronounced
the maxim, did not consider the possibility of airplanes. But neither did he imagine oil
wells. The law of trespass need no more be the same two miles below the surface than
two miles above.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
55. Id. at 11.
56. E.g., Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W.2d 558, 559-63 (Tex. 1948) (observing that
gas and distillate migrating from adjacent lands and produced from out-of-control well were not
subject to the rule of capture because the operator negligently allowed the well to blow out).
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IV. IMPLEMENTING A CORRELATIVE RIGHTS-BASED SYSTEM
FOR DEVELOPING OIL AND GAS
A. A CALL FOR ACTION—WHERE IS THE SIERRA CLUB?
The oil and gas industry, and the governments that regulate it, have
been content with an imperfect capture-based system for preventing waste
and protecting correlative rights. This means the catalyst for change to a
more effective system for preventing waste and protecting correlative rights
will most likely have to come from forces outside the industry and its regulators. “Waste” associated with the development of oil and gas resources is
a subject that should be on the list of every public interest organization
interested in sustainable development, conservation, alternative sources of
energy, and environmental protection.
Once environmental groups
acknowledge that oil and gas development will take place, they have an
interest in seeing that it is pursued so as to maximize recovery of the
resource with minimal environmental impact.57
Most of the efforts of public interest environmental organizations are
directed toward preventing or at least obstructing development. Environmental organizations’ ideal world is one in which no oil or gas is consumed.58 One way to prevent consumption is to prevent development of the
resource, or at least make it more expensive to develop thereby making
alternative energy resources more competitive. When the climate change
card is played, it provides environmental organizations with the moral
imperative for eliminating the oil and gas industry altogether.59 It is hard

57. See Ben Casselman, Sierra Club’s Pro-Gas Dilemma, National Group’s Stance Angers
On-the-Ground Environmentalists in Several States, WALL ST. J., Dec. 22, 2009, at A6, available
at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB126135534799299475 html (noting that the national Sierra
Club has endorsed the development and use of natural gas as a bridge fuel to wean the country off
of coal and oil as it moves towards renewable energy sources such as wind and solar power).
58. See, e.g., Center for Biological Diversity, http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/programs/
public_lands/energy/dirty_energy_development/ (under the heading “Dirty Energy Development”) (last visited Mar. 8, 2010) (noting that “the ultimate result of oil and gas development is
fossil fuel consumption, which pollutes our air and water and contributes to the global warming
that threatens us all”).
59. John Dickerson, “What in the Hell Do They Think is Causing It?”: Al Gore Talks About
Global Warming, Those E-mails, and His New Book, SLATE, Dec. 8, 2009, available at
http://www.slate.com/id/2237789/. If you build your organization’s reason for existing around a
specific problem, such as water pollution, and a regulatory system develops to solve or at least
effectively manage the problem, the organization ceases to be relevant. However, if the problem
is much more generic, like carbon emissions, relatively unsolvable in the short term, and associated with consequences of biblical proportions, the organization will remain relevant so long as
the public believes in the looming threat posed by the problem. The only risk to such a program is
with information that: (1) raises doubt as to the theory on which the problem is based; (2) raises
doubt about government’s ultimate ability to solve or mitigate the problem; or (3) accurately
identifies the real costs to the citizenry to address the threat. Environmental strategists must also
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for the public to ignore a real, looming, global catastrophe in the making—
unless, of course, responding to it will require significantly increasing a
consumer’s electric bill—then all bets are off; bring on Armageddon!
Until that glorious day when oil and gas are no longer important to the
world and the American people, it will be extracted from the ground in
North Dakota and elsewhere.60 Therefore, it becomes important for the task
to be accomplished in the most efficient and effective manner possible
while minimizing adverse environmental impacts. This should be a concern
to all environmental groups, even those with the mission of ultimately
shutting down the oil and gas industry. In the meantime, significant
environmental benefits can be obtained by simply advocating for a more
demanding regulatory program of preventing waste and protecting correlative rights. Such a program is possible by pursuing regulatory and development policies that treat correlative rights as the foundational property
principle instead of the rule of capture. The required program of public

be careful not to place a precise time line for Armageddon or suggest that it is too late to solve the
problem. Al Gore, in January 2006, suggested we may have only ten years to act. William Booth,
Al Gore, Sundance’s Leading Man, “An Inconvenient Truth” Documents His Efforts To Raise
Alarm on Effects of Global Warming, WASH. POST, Jan. 26, 2006, available at http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/01/25/AR2006012502230 html (“[Al Gore] is
also a very serious guy who believes humans may have only 10 years left to save the planet from
turning into a frying pan.”). Mr. Gore has, more recently, focused less on a time line and more on
the impact of failing to act. In a recent interview for Slate, Al Gore observed:We face the gravest
threat that civilization has ever confronted. It’s global in nature and requires a global
solution. Increased CO2 emissions anywhere, whether from China or the United States
or from one of the countries that is burning its forests like Brazil or Indonesia—from
wherever the emissions come, they have the same effect: They trap much more heat
from the sun, melt the ice, raise the sea level, cause stronger storms, floods, drought,
bigger fires, generate millions of climate refugees, destabilize political systems,
threaten the growing of food crops and cause a number of other catastrophic
consequences which, taken together, threaten the basis for the future of human
civilization on the Earth. Because these consequences are distributed globally, the
problem masquerades as a distraction. Because the length of time between causes and
consequences stretches out longer than we’re used to dealing with, it gives us the
illusion that we have the luxury of time. Neither of those things is true. The crisis is a
concrete threatening reality today. It stands to get catastrophically worse unless we
take action before the accumulation [of] this global warming pollution reaches such
toxic levels that the problem becomes bigger than we can solve.
John Dickerson, “What in the Hell Do They Think is Causing It?”: Al Gore Talks About Global
Warming, Those E-mails, and His New Book, SLATE, Dec. 8, 2009, available at http://www.
slate.com/id/2237789/.
60. The latest forecast of United States energy consumption into the year 2035 projects that
fossil fuels will continue to provide 78% of all the energy used in 2035. Total energy consumption is predicted to grow by 14% between 2008 and 2035. United States crude oil production is
predicted to increase from 5 million barrels per day in 2008 to over 6 million barrels per day in
2027 and continuing at that level through 2035. Press Release, U.S. Energy Info. Admin., EIA
Energy Outlook Projects Moderate Growth in U.S. Energy Consumption, Greater Use of Renewables, and Reduced Oil and Natural Gas Imports (Dec. 14, 2009), available at http://www.
eia.doe.gov/neic/press/press334 html.
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interest intervention into the actual development of oil and gas can be pursued at several levels.
B. A PLAN FOR ACTION
To effectively attack the entrenched capture-based approach to conservation regulation, an appropriate coalition of industry, environmental, and
consumer interests must prepare to make its case before each state’s oil and
gas conservation agency, reviewing courts, and the state legislature.61 The
coalition’s goal should be to shift the capture-based well-by-well regulatory
systems to a correlative rights-based reservoir regulatory system.
First, environmental groups should seek out industry support for the
concept of developing oil and gas resources in the state on a reservoir basis
as opposed to a well-by-well basis. Although it is doubtful support will
come from any of the industry associations,62 there are probably a few
enlightened engineer-dominated companies in each state that would readily
appreciate the benefits of reservoir development.63 Many of these same
companies would most likely welcome the opportunity to work with environmental groups that advocate any sort of constructive form of oil and gas
development.64 Consumer groups are likely to join any campaign that
promises to reduce the ultimate cost of producing oil and gas. In many
states, there may be state-sanctioned consumer advocacy groups that traditionally focus their efforts on utility rate-making issues.65 When consumer

61. An alternative plan would involve federal legislation that requires all states to adopt oil
and gas conservation practices that maximize production conservation while minimizing environmental impacts.
62. Industry associations typically have too diverse a mix of membership to take on controversial issues. This would certainly qualify as a controversial issue. The most likely opponents to
abandoning well-by-well development of a reservoir will be the smaller operators who would fear,
legitimately in many cases, that development will become dominated by the larger operators.
63. The oil and gas industry is steeped in tradition and predictability. Therefore, any major
change in the development process will be opposed because it is new and the risks and rewards
cannot be definitively evaluated on an individual company basis. The major concern will be that
the larger, more technically sophisticated or better capitalized operators will dominate development on a reservoir basis. Individual operators would no longer have the rule of capture to protect
their ability to go-it-alone on a well-by-well basis. This is probably an accurate observation, but it
would seem to support reservoir development as opposed to argue against it. Prevention of waste
and the protection of correlative rights of all owners in the reservoir counsels in favor of allowing
the best operator—however that is defined by the conservation agency—to direct operations.
64. See, e.g., Casselman, supra note 57, at A6 (observing that Chesapeake Energy Corporation’s president has made appearances with the Sierra Club’s executive director to promote the use
of natural gas to replace coal).
65. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 66-1222 to 1223 (2002) (stating the Kansas Legislature has
authorized a citizens’ utility ratepayer board to advocate for consumer interests before the Kansas
Corporation Commission). In Kansas, the corporation commission has jurisdiction over public
utility issues, oil and gas conservation issues, and all environmental issues associated with oil and
gas development. See generally Kansas Corporation Commission, http://www kcc.state ks.us/
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groups are properly educated on the economic benefits of reservoir
development versus well-by-well development, they should be willing to
join with a coalition advocating an end to capture-based conservation
regulation.
Second, armed with, or without, industry support, environmental
groups must enter the trenches of oil and gas conservation law by participating in seemingly mundane well spacing and related conservation proceedings before the state agency charged with regulating the industry.66
This is where the process of changing the capture-based model must begin.67 State regulatory commissions will typically have broad, aspirational
policy mandates. For example, the North Dakota Industrial Commission
operates under the following statutory mission statement:
It is hereby declared to be in the public interest to foster, to
encourage, and to promote the development, production, and
utilization of natural resources of oil and gas in the state in such a
manner as will prevent waste; to authorize and to provide for the
operation and development of oil and gas properties in such a
manner that a greater ultimate recovery of oil and gas be had and
that the correlative rights of all owners be fully protected; and to
encourage and to authorize cycling, recycling, pressure maintenance, and secondary recovery operations in order that the greatest possible economic recovery of oil and gas be obtained within
the state to the end that the landowners, the royalty owners, the
producers, and the general public realize and enjoy the greatest
possible good from these vital natural resources.68
The challenge in many cases will be to convince the commission to
focus on this broader policy directive when carrying out the more specific
statutory directives regarding the prevention of waste and protection of

(last visited Mar. 8, 2010) (providing information on the Kansas Corporation Commission);
Citizens’ Utility Ratepayers Board, http://curb kcc.state ks.us/about htm (last visited Mar. 8, 2010)
(providing information on the Citizens’ Utility Ratepayer Board).
66. In North Dakota, the relevant agency is the Industrial Commission. N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 38-08-02(2) (2004) (defining “commission” to mean “industrial commission”). “The commission has continuing jurisdiction and authority over all persons and property, public and private,
necessary to enforce effectively the provisions of this chapter.” Id. § 38-08-04. The chapter
referred to in section 38-08-04 is chapter 38-08, Control of Gas and Oil Resources, which contains
all the North Dakota oil and gas conservation statutes. Id. §§ 38-08-01 to -23.
67. A more efficient manner to address the issue may be through a generic proceeding
initiated by the commission at the request of the interested parties. However, important ground
work can be laid by seeking to participate in spacing hearings to ensure that more than just the
competing positions of the developers are considered by the commission. This process would
force the commission to focus on the rights of the public and all owners in the affected reservoir.
68. Id. § 38-08-01.
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correlative rights. Ironically, the major impediment to a broad application
of these policy directives will be found within the conservation laws themselves. Because the existing laws are built around the rule of capture, their
specific terms will often be artificially restrictive. This is particularly the
case when it comes to the potentially most effective conservation tool in
most state’s existing conservation statutes: compulsory unitization.69 Unless the commission is willing to engage in considerable arm-twisting to
facilitate the necessary voluntary agreement among the parties,70 improvements in compulsory unitization will have to come from the legislature.
The third level of attack derives from the second. In those situations
where conservation commissions assert, or are held, to lack the authority to
take meaningful action, this should be followed-up with the necessary legislative campaign to modernize conservation laws to truly maximize the prevention of waste and protection of correlative rights. Professors Anderson
and Smith have laid out a detailed approach for pursuing exploratory
unitization.71 However, their program, although properly characterized as
“ambitious” and “controversial,”72 is not nearly ambitious enough because
it still functions under a capture-based model requiring some level of owner
approval.73
To effectively abandon the capture-based model, a conservation regulatory program must first grant the commission authority, coupled with the
affirmative obligation, to ensure all oil and gas development within the state
takes place so as to maximize recovery of the oil and gas resource in the
most economically efficient and environmentally benign manner possible.

69. But see TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 85.046(a)(7) (Vernon 2001). Notably, Texas lacks
any sort of compulsory unitization authority and even has language in its statute defining “waste”
to ensure it cannot be interpreted to require unitization. Id.
70. “Arm-twisting” could take the form of ordering a field shut-in because uncoordinated
production is causing waste. The implicit solution to this problem would be for the owners in the
field to enter into “voluntary” unitization agreements. Texas, the state with the most to gain from
unitized development, is hopelessly stuck in a political quagmire between small tract owners and
large tract owners. See Jacqueline Lang Weaver, The Politics of Oil and Gas Jurisprudence: The
Eighty-Six Percent Factor, 33 WASHBURN L.J. 492, 503-06 (1994). This highlights the political
realities when seeking to change an existing system that, in effect, allocates wealth. To the extent
the current system favors one group over another, the favored group will, of course, lobby against
any change. This state of affairs in Texas has ensured the status quo, once established, will not
change, regardless of the waste it may cause or the correlative rights it may trammel.
71. Anderson & Smith, Domestic Exploration and Production, supra note 11, at 2-86 to 294.
72. Id. at 2-94. Professors Anderson and Smith constrain themselves by focusing on what
they view as being generally acceptable to the regulated community. I have not so constrained
myself because the issues are much broader than what the regulated community believes is
acceptable. There are other important constituencies besides royalty owners and their lessees.
73. Although they do not offer a specific percentage, they suggest that anything in excess of
fifty percent may be too high. Id. at 2-88 n.345.

778

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 85:759

To accomplish this goal, the commission must assume an active role in
determining how development will transpire in each reservoir, from the
initial wildcat well through completion of enhanced recovery operations.74
For example, the commission should require that exploration and development wells are drilled not to conform to a pattern of acreage squares and
rectangles, but rather that each well is justified to properly develop the oil
and gas reservoir.75 Developers must coordinate their efforts to obtain the
information required to determine the probable limits of a reservoir and
thereby identify those who have an ownership interest in the development.
All owners’ rights would be protected by ensuring their correlative
rights in the reservoir are identified, quantified, and recognized in an appropriate manner. Instead of going-it-alone under a capture-based regime, they
would be forced to participate as a member of the emerging reservoir community.76 With regard to existing reservoirs, the commission should be able
to order unitized development whenever the facts indicate it makes sense
technically and economically. The key to all these proposals is a conservation commission that is proactive at ensuring the maximum amount of oil
and gas is recovered with the fewest number of wells and that the risks and
rewards of exploration and development are properly allocated among all
who have a property interest in the reservoir.
V. CONCLUSION
The rule of capture has dominated American oil and gas law in an
unnecessarily wasteful manner for over 150 years. Throughout this same
period, courts have recognized correlative rights as an important component
of oil and gas ownership. Unfortunately, oil and gas conservation regulatory regimes have developed around the capture theme of oil and gas law
instead of around correlative rights. This can, and should, be changed.
Adopting a correlative rights focus for oil and gas conservation, as opposed
to a capture focus, allows states to maximize the conservation of oil and gas
in the production process while minimizing environmental impacts

74. This will require that the commission have access to the same level of technical expertise
and information available to oil and gas developers.
75. To achieve the necessary level of coordination between developers, the commission
would have to function as the broker by setting the terms on which drilling permits are granted.
The commission’s power to grant, deny, and condition drilling permits should allow it to
effectively control the development process.
76. The community may change as additional information becomes available and boundaries
are expanded and contracted. The commission, assuming an active role in this process, should be
able to ensure a more perfect identification and allocation of rights in the reservoir.
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associated with the drilling of unnecessary wells under a capture-based
regime.
History, or inertia, has proven that the industry and state regulatory
agencies have been unable to move away from their capture-based world. It
will require new public constituencies to accomplish the shift away from
capture toward correlative rights and real waste prevention. These new
constituencies should come from consumers, surface owners, and environmental groups as they actively seek to minimize the number of wells
required to efficiently develop the oil and gas resource.

